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NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES-MENTAL .ANGUISH FROM WITNESSING PERIL OF

THIRD PARTY-Plaintiffs (husband, wife, and three children) incurred

physical injuries and a fourth child was burned to death in an automobile
collision with the defendant's vehicle. Plaintiffs claimed compensation
for mental anguish sustained from witnessing the death of the child.
Defendant's motion to strike the allegations of mental suffering, held,
granted. Defendant owes no legal duty to protect plaintiffs from mental
suffering caused by viewing another in peril. Lessard v. Tarca, (Conn.
Super. 1957) 133 A. (2d) 625.
It is generally agreed that, with the exceptions of mistreatment of a
corpse1 and delay in transmission of death messages by telegram,2 there
can be no recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress unless it is

14 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §868 (1939). See also 41 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1942).
2So Relle v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881). See collection of
cases in 7 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 772 (1930).
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accompanied by a physical injury.3 If it is sustained contemporaneously
with a physical injury, however, all courts allow compensation for mental suffering as an ordinary and proximate consequence of a recognized
cause of action.4 The issue producing difficulty for the courts arises when
fright causes physical injury. In this context the physical harm caused by
emotional disturbance is necessary to create a legally recognized interest.
Here the courts are split on the requirements for recovery. Some espouse
the "impact" doctrine which denies compensation unless the plaintiff
proves a contemporaneous physical impact, however trivial.5 The physical
invasion merely establishes the cause of action and is irrelevant to the
amount of damages sustained.6 Other courts adopt the non-impact theory
which regards the fright as only a link in the chain of causation between
the defendant's wrongful act and the consequent physical injury.7 All
courts, however, deny recovery if the plaintiff's physical injury proceeds
from fear, not of personal harm to himself, but to the person of another,
unless the plaintiff is within the zone of foreseeable physical injury. Otherwise, liability for negligence becomes limitless, according to the leading
case of Waube v. Warrington. 8 Thus, some courts have held that plaintiff
may recover for the effects of fright due to fear for her child where plaintiff

s Wyman v. •Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880). See cases in 23 A.L.R. 361, 365 (1923), supplemented in 44 A.L.R. 428, 429 (1926); 56 A.L.R. 657 (1928).
4 1 TORTS R.EsrATEMENT §47(2) (1934; Supp. 1948). Connecticut has followed this rule
since Seger v. Town of ·Bakkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290 (1853).
5 "The point decided in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 168 Mass. 285 and White
v. Sander, 168 Mass. 296 is not put as a logical deduction from the general principles of
liability in tort, ,but as a limitation of those principles upon purely practical grounds."
Holmes, C. J., in Smith v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576 at 577-578, 55
N.E. 380 (1899).
.
6 "Recovery has been allowed where there has been physical impact, but it has
been frankly said that where there has been impact the damages recoverable are not
limited to those resulting therefrom. The magic formula 'impact' is pronounced; the
door opens to the full joy of a complete recovery." Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbance
as Legal Damage," 20 MrcH. L. REv. 497 at 504 (1922). This article contains an excellent
discussion of the physical effects of fright.
7 Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. (2d) 402 (1941). See Throckmorton,
"Damages for Fright,'' 34 HARV. L. REv. 260 (1921), for collection of cases from impact
and non-impact states. See also 11 A.L.R. 1119, 1128, 1134 (1921), supplemented in 40
A.L.R. 983, 984, 985 (1926); 76 A.L.R. 681, 682, 684 (1932); 98 AJL.R. 402, 403 (1935).
8 216 Wis. 603 at 613, 258 N.W. 497 (1935): "The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended. It is our conclusion that they can
neither justly nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical injuries sustained
by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of witnessing
another's danger." Some writers have suggested an exception to this rule where a parent's
fright and consequent physical injury result from perceiving danger to the child although
the parent is outside the area of expectible physical danger. See PROSSER, TORTS 181-182
(1955); HARv. L. RECORD, Feb. 21, 1957, p. 2:2-4; Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts," 50 HARv.
L. REv. 725 (1937). The Restatement of Torts e.xpressed no opinion where a spouse or
parent suffers shock and consequent bodily harm from witnessing the peril or harm to
the spouse or child, though recovery would be denied to all other persons, 2 TORTS
R.EsrATEMENT §313, caveat (1934).
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was warding off a chimpanzee attacking the child; 9 where plaintiff was on
first floor and a truck crashed into the basement where the children were
playing; 10 and where plaintiff was in the house and a runaway truck
endangered a child on the porch.11 The principal case lends itself to this
analysis since the plaintiffs were riding in the car which was struck by
the defendant and, therefore, were distinctly within the zone of foreseeable
danger. Moreover, they received physical injuries from the same act of the
defendant which caused the death of the child. The court, however, did
not accept this analysis and relied instead upon a recent Connecticut
decision12 in which the plaintiff was not in peril of physical injury so
that there was no breach of duty to her. However, the principal case is
distinguishable on the facts in that plaintiffs sustained physical injuries
from the same negligent act which caused the child's death. Few decisions
have involved this situation. The courts are not unanimous, but those
denying recovery rely upon decisions in which the plaintiff was not in
personal peril.13 It is submitted that the Connecticut court failed to consider the distinction between proximate cause and duty. If the defendant's
negligence resulted in physical injury to the deceased only, fright and
physical disturbance suffered by an onlooking plaintiff outside the area
of expectible physical danger would not be legally compensable, for there
would be no duty owing to him.14 However, in the principal case there
was a violation of a legaUy protected interest in that each plaintiff
sustained physical injuries from the defendant's conduct. The mental
suffering, although the result of witnessing the peril of another person,
merely became one element of the damages. The right of each plaintiff
was independent and was not based on injury to another person. As
already shown,15 emotional distress is compensable when associated with
a recognized cause of action. Adopting the view of the principal case
create~ a paradoxical situation, for while this court denies compensation
to a mother for mental anguish caused by witnessing the death of her
child, other courts have allowed it· to a physically injured, pregnant
plaintiff for anguish caused by fears that harm may result to her unborn
child.16 The principal case illustrates that courts should re-examine the
Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918).
(1933).
578, 47 ,P. (2d) 1037 (1935).
(1953).
13 Alston v. Cooley, 5 La. App. 623 (1927); Shenvood v. Ticheli, 10 La. App. 280,
120 S. 107 (1929). Taylor v. Spokane, Portland 8: Seattle Railway Co., 72 Wash. 378, 130
P. 506 (1913), and Clough v. Steen, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 392, 39 P. (2d) 889 (1934), are sometimes cited but the language of the courts in both is ambiguous. Contra, Humphrey v.
Twin State Gas and Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139 A. 440 (1927). Austin v. Mascarin, Ont.
R. 165, 2 D.L.R. 316 (1942) allows recovery although the reason is unclear.
14 Waube v. Warrington, note 8 supra.
15 See note 3 supra.
16 Fehely v. Senders, 170 Ore. 457, 135 P. (2d) 283 (1943); Rosen v. Yellow Cab Co.,
162 Pa. Super. 58, 56 A. (2d) 398 (1948). Contra, Nevala v. Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205
N.W. 93 (1925). See collection of cases in 145 A.L.R. 1092, 1109 (1943).
9

10 Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182
11 Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash.
12 Fedukowski v. Fedukowski, 18 Conn. Sup. 248
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entire problem, shorn of legalisms, to remove the artificialities and inconsistencies. The courts have started in this direction and probably will so
continue.17 It is therefore unfortunate that the principal case, instead
of clarifying issues, constitutes an addition to a legal labyrinth.
Mark Shaevsky

17 I STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906): "The treatment of
any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of
legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow
be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social,
economic, and ind_ustrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law."

